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We have all been appalled at the abuse suffered by so many young girls in 
Rotherham. Children were ignored, sometimes even blamed, and issues were swept 
under the carpet – often because of a warped and misguided sense of political 
correctness. That culture of denial which let them down so badly must be eradicated. 
Today, I am sending an unequivocal message that professionals who fail to protect 
children will be held properly accountable and council bosses who preside over such 
catastrophic failure will not see rewards for that failure.  
 
David Cameron, 3 March 2015 
 
Introduction 
On the morning of the Child Sexual Exploitation summit (March, 2015) David Cameron 
announced that social workers and other local officials across the country may face up to 
five years’ imprisonment if they were to wilfully neglect child abuse. He proposed that a 
new piece of legislation would be introduced which would send “an unequivocal message” 
to social workers that those who failed to protect children properly would be held properly 
accountable (Holehouse, 2015). This announcement was made following the release of an 
independent inquiry report into child sexual exploitation (CSE) in Rotherham. The author of 
this report was a senior civil servant, Louise Casey.  
Casey was appointed to lead on this inspection into Rotherham Metropolitan Borough 
Council (RMBC) by Eric Pickles, Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government. 
At the time, Casey was working for Pickles as Director General of the Troubled Families 
programme. Although both projects referred to different situations, CSE in Rotherham and 
‘turning around’ lives of troubled young people in the other, there are a number of 
similarities between the two (Casey, 2012:4). Partly, this was because children’s welfare has 
long been a source of concern for politicians but also because in more recent years there 
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has been an explicit focus on penalising certain groups which fail to accept responsibility for 
their own actions (Gillies, 2005). Casey’s findings from the Rotherham Inspection would not 
only raise a number of concerns about the way in which CSE was handled but it would also 
produce information which would promote the criminalisation of social workers 
(Featherstone et al. 2015).  
Despite this contentious issue it is difficult to disagree with the Rotherham Report’s opening 
declaration which stated that ‘terrible things happened and on a significant scale’ (Casey 
2015:5). However, whilst we agree with this comment and believe that substantial 
improvements do need to be made to the way in which professionals approach child sexual 
exploitation, we will argue that the inspection carried out may actually prevent us from fully 
understanding what did happen in Rotherham, why it happened and consequently, what is 
required to minimise the chances of it happening again.  
In this article, we will begin by detailing the historical context in order to explain what 
happened in Rotherham between the years of 1997-2015 and how certain events 
culminated with the initiation of Casey’s investigation. We will then explore the report 
produced following the Rotherham inspection which we will refer to throughout the rest of 
the paper as the ‘Casey Report’. By using Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) approach we will 
firstly examine what was written in the report and how it was written and, then, using 
Steven Lukes’ Three Dimensional Power framework, we will discuss some of the issues that 
we expected would be discussed but were not.    
In our analysis of the report we will explore and discuss why we believe there may be more 
‘uncomfortable truths’ than those explicitly highlighted in the Casey report (Casey, 2015: 5).  
We will then conclude by making the argument that the current government’s ‘moral 
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agenda’ and neo-liberal reforms, which actively focus on local practice and local politics, do 
little to actually address the problem of CSE (Gillies, 2005:71). We suggest that if social work 
organisations are to address this issue properly then all groups in society need to work 
together deferentially.  
Setting the scene: Rotherham 1997-2015  
The phenomenon of CSE has only been fully recognised recently (Home Affairs Select 
Committee, 2013). Although social workers have been coming to terms with understanding 
how to handle issues such as secrecy and grooming since the 1980s, they have been 
‘clueless’ when faced with the ‘organised barbarianism’ perpetrated on young women by 
groups of men (Ferguson, 2015). Thus in the early 1990s when community youth workers in 
Rotherham, a large town in the South of Yorkshire, started to uncover information relating 
to this new form of child abuse, which was being perpetrated by adults against children as 
young as 11, there was little properly known about it at that time (Pidd, 2014).  
Youth workers however were still concerned with what they learned and reported their 
anxieties to senior members of Rotherham Council. In 1997, the council responded by 
founding a youth project, called Risky Business. Its purpose was to carry out voluntary work 
with young people between 11 and 25 years, providing sexual health advice, and help in 
relation to alcohol and drugs, self-harm, eating disorders, parenting and budgeting. By the 
late 1990s, Risky Business had identified that there were a large number of girls who were 
at risk of sexual exploitation (Jay, 2014). Yet despite promising to make CSE a priority, the 
support of senior members from the police and the council began to wane once reports 
started to reveal that the number of children being abused was growing and that this abuse 
was being predominantly perpetrated by Asian men (Pidd, 2014). 
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In 2002 a study was carried out by an unnamed home office researcher. Her findings 
suggested that an estimated 270 children had been sexually exploited. However, senior 
police officers were reluctant to believe the data contained in the research report and 
argued that these figures were in fact exaggerated (Williams, 2014) . In an effort to prove 
the figures were excessive the police commissioned another researcher, Dr Angie Heal, to 
carry out further evaluations. This led to two further reports being published in 2003 and 
2006 which not only supported the findings of the home office report but also indicated that 
there were links between CSE and drugs, guns and criminality in the borough (Jay, 2014).   
The findings from the Heal reports were taken seriously and prompted a series of police 
investigations which took place between 2008 and 2013. Operation Central began in 2008 
and in 2010, eight men were tried for a series of sexual offences against young girls. 
However, despite 80 perpetrators having been originally identified, only five were indicted 
(Pidd, 2014). Rotherham failed to secure any further convictions until February 2016, when 
four men and two men were found guilty of 55 offences (BBC, 2016).  
In September 2012, confidential police and social services’ documents which threatened to 
expose a deliberate ‘cover up’ of information by the council were leaked to investigative 
journalist Andrew Norfolk from The Times newspaper (Home Affairs Select Committee, 
2013). It was at this point, when the media became interested in Rotherham, that the 
situation started to gather more momentum. Norfolk’s articles prompted the Home Affairs 
Select Committee (HASC) (2012-2013) to carry out a year-long inquiry into the issue of 
localised grooming which was reported to have taken place in both Rochdale and 
Rotherham.  
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Although the HASC report was extremely critical of the practice conducted by both local 
authorities, it was even more disparaging towards Rotherham. This was in part because the 
Chief Executive in Rochdale appeared to have ‘faced the situation head on’ (Home Affairs 
Select Committee, 2013:27) whereas the Rotherham Local Safeguarding Children’s Board 
was criticised for trying to protect rather than scrutinize its members (Home Affairs Select 
Committee, 2013). Nonetheless the committee recognised that CSE was a national problem, 
not one just reserved to the North as depicted by Andrew Norfolk investigative journalism. 
The HASC (2013) further identified that the majority of Local Children Safeguarding Boards 
were not fulfilling their responsibilities because professionals appeared to misunderstand 
the grooming process by assuming that young people were willing participants rather than 
victims of sexual abuse. But what is also of interest, and a point we will return to later, is 
that the HASC also noted that the majority of child protection practice was focused on 
children under 5, and not on teenagers. Despite highlighting this as an issue, it is interesting 
to note that no consideration was given as to why this may have been the case.  
The HASC (2013:62) concluded their report by making a number of recommendations to 
government, most importantly that ‘the commitment must be maintained’ to tackle this 
problem nationwide.  these included improved training and also an increase in resources. 
However, both the Children’s Minister at the time, Tim Loughton, and his successor Edward 
Timpson, both felt that their focus needed to be channelled towards ensuring ‘a decrease in 
resources’ (2013:11). Their comments concerned the HASC who responded by arguing that 
if CSE was to be tackled appropriately then the government needed to recognise that the 
‘failure of these cases was both systemic and cultural’ (2013:11). Therefore, if government 
were to seriously tackle this issue they needed to provide authorities with more resources 
and support.  
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 In November 2013, in response to the Committee’s findings, Rotherham Council 
commissioned Professor Alexis Jay to lead an independent inquiry into the situation. They 
were not prepared for what she would find. Instead of confirming the findings of the Heal 
Reports which asserted that hundreds of children had been sexually exploited, Jay 
contended that the figure was actually closer to 1400; a number she considered to be a 
‘conservative estimate’ (Jay, 2014: 1). In addition, Jay condemned Rotherham for failing to 
act effectively against the abuse that had been undertaken. Although Jay recognised that 
‘good work’ had been carried out by Risky Business, she asserted that the agency had not 
been consulted or listened to effectively, because its success incited ‘professional jealousy’ 
in others (Jay, 2014: 81).  
On the 10th of September 2015, Eric Pickles announced that there would be yet another 
independent inspection which would examine the council’s exercise of its functions on 
governance, children and young people, and taxi and private hire licensing (DCLG, 2014a). 
Despite numerous other locations such as Bristol, Oxford, Newcastle Rochdale, and Derby 
experiencing similar concerns about large scale CSE, Rotherham was the only place that 
‘benefitted’ from central government scrutiny. This inspection would be led by Louise Casey, 
who is also well known for her candour and her ability to get things done quickly. Casey’s 
opposition to the kind of methodical, rigorous research that might lead to more credible 
findings is renowned. During a speech to the Association of Chief Police Officers, she argued 
that research was a hindrance and not a help and stated that “If No. 10 says bloody 
'evidence-based policy' to me one more time I'll deck them” (The Guardian, 2005).  
However although these comments sound alarming, there were still other concerns to be 
considered.  In her Troubled Families role, Pickles was the minister to whom Casey 
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ultimately reported to. It was therefore concerning when Casey was selected to lead the 
Rotherham inspection given that Pickles had made claims that the report would be an 
‘independent inspection’ (DCLG, 2014b). Even though Casey was certainly independent of 
Rotherham, she was not independent from central government, the agency which 
commissioned her report.   
Casey has also been noted to have a clear position on social workers which is as unequivocal 
as her position on research. When discussing the Troubled Families Programme, Casey has 
been quoted as saying ‘we are not running some cuddly social workers’ programme to wrap 
everybody in cotton wool’ (quoted in Winnett and Kirkup 2012) as well as suggesting in her 
own report that social workers colluded with parents to find excuses for their failures 
(Casey, 2013).  
Despite these antagonistic feelings towards social workers being voiced publicly, Casey’s 
report into Rotherham was still accepted unconditionally by the government. The findings, 
which reported that social work agencies were ‘in denial’ and unable to deal with 
‘uncomfortable truths’ (Casey, 2015:5), would not only lead to the resignation of the entire 
Cabinet of Rotherham Council, but also initiate plans to implement a criminal charge for 
those who failed to protect children from sexual exploitation (Stevenson, 2015). In the next 
section we explain the methodology used to analyse the Casey Report in more detail.  
Methodology and Theoretical Framework 
A Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) approach, known as the Discourse Historical Approach 
(DHA), was adopted to analyse the Casey Report. Although there is no consistent CDA 
methodology and no single way of gathering data (Wodak & Meyer, 2009), Fairclough & 
Wodak (1997: 258) suggest that CDA examines discourse – language use in speech and 
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writing – as a form of ‘social practice’ because ‘discourse is socially constitutive’. As well as 
being socially conditioned, it also constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social 
identities and relationships between people and groups of people. Since discourse is so 
socially consequential, it gives rise to important issues of power and may, under certain 
conditions, be operationalised or put into practice (Fairclough, 2010).  
Using DHA to analyse documents, such as the Casey Report, enables researchers to decipher 
‘the ideologies that establish, perpetuate or fight dominance’ (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009: 88). 
Reisigl and Wodak (2001) recommend a focus on five questions identified within the DHA 
which are: How are persons named and referred to linguistically? What traits, 
characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to them? By means of what arguments 
and argumentation schemes do specific persons or social groups try to justify and legitimise 
the exclusion, discrimination, suppression and exploitation of others? From what 
perspective or point of view are these namings, attributions and arguments expressed? And 
are the respective discriminating utterances articulated overtly, are they even intensified or 
are they mitigated? These five questions help to identify different types of discursive 
strategies which Reisigl and Wodak (2001) have referred to as: referential; predicational; 
argumentation; framing; and intensifying.  
These strategies enabled us to carefully identify and examine inconsistencies and paradoxes 
within the Casey report (2015). This method of critique also made explicit ways in which 
discourse(s) may have been manipulated and operationalized which we considered to be 
highly significant given that the report was concerned with the practice of child protection. 
However, we recognised that analysing the discourse(s) within the Casey Report only 
enabled an examination of what had been published and more specifically, what was 
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deemed to be publishable. We thus developed our analysis further by drawing from Steven 
Lukes’ radical view of power. This provided us with a framework to consider and examine 
information that was not to be found in the content of the report but which could 
reasonably be expected to be considered or included.  
Lukes (2005) has highlighted how there is a second dimension involved because the exercise 
of power goes beyond explicit and overt behaviour in decision-making. Drawing on the work 
of Crenson (1971:26) who argued that the proper object of investigation is ‘not political 
activity but political inactivity’, the second dimension encourages the examination of the 
ways in which legitimate issues, concerns and grievances have been kept off political 
agendas by effectively closing off discussions. Lukes (2005: 28) extended this analysis of 
power further to include a ‘third dimension’ whereby power is used to ensure legitimate 
grievances are not even raised because people ‘can see or imagine no alternative to it’.  
All three dimensions of power are considered in the following sections. In part one of the 
findings section, we explore how DHA analysis of the text in the Casey Report revealed the 
observable interests and decisions of politicians. In part two, we consider some of the 
‘uncomfortable truths’ which were absent from the report and discuss the factors that had 
been suppressed (Casey, 2015:5). In the discussion section, we examine why the focus of 
the government’s response was to predominantly frame CSE as a ‘local government’ 
problem, rather than address the myriad of structural factors which contribute to children’s 
vulnerability nationally. 
Part 1: Discourse analysis of the Casey Report 
1. Labelling Rotherham as a ‘troubled’ organisation 
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The first discursive strategy that we used to analyse the report was ‘referential or 
nomination strategies’ (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001: 44). By examining how persons were named 
or referred to linguistically in the Rotherham Report, we noted that participants were rarely 
discussed as individuals. Instead, the behaviours and (in)actions of these individuals were 
imputed to whole organisations. In the same way that an anti-social or truanting child is 
enough for a family to be labelled as ‘troubled’ (Casey, 2012), the failings of officers and 
councillors from RMBC were treated as a failing of the entire council. This created a political 
myth that Rotherham is a single homogeneous entity, not an organisation which consists of 
different individuals from different hierarchies, for example: 
Rotherham has at times taken more care of its reputation than it has of its most need 
(p5) 
RMBC demonstrates a resolute denial of what has happened in the borough (p10) 
RMBC has a culture of suppressing bad news and ignoring difficult issues. This culture 
is deep-rooted; RMBC goes to some length to cover up information and to silence 
whistle-blowers (p11) 
 
When writing about the creation of political myths, Ernst Cassirer (1946: 285) argued that in 
‘primitive societies’, it was not the individuals but the group which was ‘the moral subject’ 
whereby ‘a sort of miasma or social contagion’ developed and encouraged contamination of 
others. It was as a result of this collective identity that revenge and punishment was 
therefore directed to the group as a whole rather than specific individuals. However, it 
needs to be noted his was not always case in the Casey Report because in some parts staff 
were praised:  
Inspectors found many committed, hardworking and dedicated staff working for Rotherham 
Council including frontline staff and social workers. Inspectors acknowledge that it cannot be 
easy for them to go into work every day intending to do a good job… (p14) 
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Yet, in the majority of cases, where individuals were commended, it appeared as if they 
were being utilised to demonstrate that they were exceptions to the rule because they were 
acting in the face of significant pressure. 
2. Traits of Rotherham 
The use of ‘predicational’ discursive strategies (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001: 44) was examined to 
understand the ways in which traits, characteristics, qualities and features of participants, or 
more specifically, of RMBC in its entirety, were presented in the report. Casey (2015) 
identified that RMBC had three main traits: a series of problematic cultures; an attitude of 
denial; and archaic attitudes and dispositions.   
A series of problematic cultures 
The word ‘culture’ appears 38 times in the Casey Report. In the overwhelming majority of 
these instances, it is used to depict problematic behaviours originating within, and specific 
to, the council. We are informed that Rotherham suffered from, ‘an archaic culture of 
sexism, bullying and discomfort around race’ (p9). This point is reinforced a page later when 
we are reminded that there was ‘a pervading culture of sexism, bullying and silencing 
debate’ (p10) which suppressed ‘bad news’ and ignored ‘difficult issues’. This problem which 
was not only ‘deep-rooted’ (p11) but stemmed from ‘a wider culture of clinging onto 
anything positive within Rotherham and not facing up to the truth of the situation’ (p24).  
Although Casey acknowledged that culture is difficult to ‘inspect’ (p28), references are still 
nonetheless made throughout the report to an ‘unhealthy culture’ (p28), a ‘macho culture’ 
(p28), a ‘culture of shouting and abuse’ (p30), a ‘culture of not following up actions’ (p66), a 
‘silo culture’ (p67) and ‘a culture of patronage and an unwillingness to tackle unacceptable 
conduct by some Councillors’ (p77). 
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This prominence of cultural explanations for the lack of action around CSE is an exemplar of 
the culturalization of politics (Brown, 2006: 19). With all the references made to culture, 
Rotherham is thus portrayed as an organisation which was ‘ruled by culture’ (Brown, 2006: 
20). With so much focus being placed on the ‘culture’ of Rotherham, the culturization of 
politics approach appears to neglect the role of the political agencies who, in the wider 
cultural context, also had a significant influence on the way in which Rotherham functioned. 
Whilst some government officials may see their role as increasing the public’s awareness of 
abuse, the approach actually adopted by policy makers and other professional groups has 
instead contributed to ‘a climate of fear, a climate of mistrust and a climate of blame’ (Ayre, 
2001:889). This is apparent in that the Casey Report fails to include the wider implications of 
the roles that policy makers have on social work practice; a significant point which even the 
HASC noted and subsequently warned Tim Loughton and Edward Timpson that any failures 
in cases of CSE needed to be considered as ‘systemic and cultural’ issues (HASC, 2013: 11).  
Elsewhere, Mamdani (2004: 18) has argued, when discussing Islam in what he terms 
‘Culture Talk’, that ‘bad’ cultures seem to have ‘no history, no politics and no debates’. 
Instead, people appear to adhere to or conform to a simplistic and apolitical notion of 
‘culture’. And in this context, this has led to the (in)actions of politicians and national 
newspapers in the case of Rotherham being excluded or overlooked in the Casey Report 
(Maier, 2013). 
An attitude of denial 
Following the interviews that were carried out as part of the investigation into Rotherham 
Casey noted that there were four ‘distinct forms of denial’ were noted:  
1. Denial of the accuracy of Professor Jay’s methods and findings;  
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2. Denial of the extent of the issue of sexual exploitation, particularly in Rotherham;  
3. Denial of culpability as a result of Rotherham holding the belief that sexual exploitation 
was ‘being dealt with elsewhere’;  
4. Denial that sexual exploitation remained a significant problem (Casey, 2015: 19).  
Yet the Casey Report gives little credence to the responses given by those who were 
interviewed. Despite quoting from the interviews of twelve participants, all of whom could 
not establish how Jay (2014) arrived at a figure of 1400 children, Casey does not use their 
concerns to explore this number further. This is concerning given that previous reports, 
carried out by the unnamed home office researcher and Dr Angie Heal, found that an 
estimated 270 children had been sexually exploited (Williams, 2014).  Instead of considering 
this, Casey argued: 
…it was not possible to assess numbers based on RMBCs own records, leaving room 
for ongoing and further disputes around the number of victims of CSE…We have 
concluded that the 1400 figure is a conservative one and that RMBC and South 
Yorkshire Police (where some also dispute the figures) would do better to concentrate 
on taking effective action rather than seeking to continue a debate about the 
numbers (2015: 22). 
 
Rather than therefore exploring the interviewees concerns further, this inconsistency which 
has emerged in the data collection is instead explained as participants who are ‘in denial’. 
Their denial to accept what has happened is then further supported through the use of 
emotive phrases such as ‘the uncontested facts ’ (p.139), ‘undeniable and cohesive facts’ 
(p.26) and ‘uncomfortable truths’ (p. 40).  Yet these affective terms do little to explicate 
how Jay arrived at the figure of 1400 children, and they do not answer the queries of the 
twelve participants. But as Skeggs (2004:81) has argued ‘texts are processes in which 
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political work is done’ and the Casey Report uses their comments to produce an argument 
that there was a collective denial present in Rotherham. Perhaps this particular narrative 
was constructed to persuade the media, the government and members of the public that 
they should be suspicious of RMBC as a whole. In doing so alternative perspectives and 
other courses of action are, in effect, de-legitimised and closed off.  
 
Archaic attitudes and dispositions 
A number of references within the report referred to temporal aspects of the different types 
of ‘cultures’ and behaviours found to symbolise Rotherham. Casey (2015) noted how ‘an 
archaic culture of sexism, bullying and discomfort around race’ (p10) emerged as a result of 
some councillors holding ‘racist or wholly outdated or inappropriate views’ (p32). It is also 
made explicit that ‘several’ participants commented that ‘going into Rotherham Council was 
like going back in time’ (p28). Yet it is again interesting to note that despite only ‘several’ 
people commenting on such a feeling, Casey still takes these views seriously enough to 
develop a theme about the attitude and disposition of Rotherham.  
This unquestioning acceptance stands in direct contrast to the action taken above when 
twelve or more participants expressed confusion as to how the figure of 1400 sexually 
exploited children was reached by Alexis Jay (2014). This is perhaps because the idea that 
RMBC was ‘outdated’ was beneficial in supporting the Casey Report’s central argument, 
namely that the council was ‘not fit for purpose’ (p9). In order to strengthen this argument 
the council was criticised for being ‘unable to move on and change’ (p5), exhibiting 
‘discomfort around race’ (p9) and being too concerned with ‘misplaced political correctness’ 
(p9). 
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Lawler (2012: 410) has highlighted how white working class communities are often depicted 
as occupying ‘anachronistic spaces’, unable to keep pace with a rapidly changing 
multicultural society. Mamdani (2004:18) has also highlighted how Islam is often portrayed 
as ‘a lifeless custom of antique people who inhabit antique lands’. In this context, Casey 
used the ‘extreme whiteness’ (Lawler, 2012: 410) of the council in working class Rotherham 
and the ‘archaic customs’ of Islam and contrasted them with metropolitan middle-class 
ethnicities which are at ease with modern multiculturalism and diversity. In doing so, the 
report is then able to firmly contend that RMBC was ‘not fit for purpose’ and that CSE was a 
localised ‘cultural’ problem because the values and beliefs of the town belong to a past time 
(p.5).  
3. Rotherham is solely responsible 
An examination of ‘argumentation strategies’ (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001: 44) highlighted two 
core arguments in the Casey Report: the first justified the exclusion of other agencies from 
being held accountable for the failures in Rotherham; and the second emphasised the 
strength of the ‘evidence’ against RMBC.  
The first argument proposed that CSE was an issue which was best tackled by local services. 
This argument ensured that the blame for the level of sexual exploitation that took place 
was the sole responsibility of services in Rotherham and South Yorkshire. At the same time, 
this localised focus nourished the view that the Rotherham situation was a one-off. Two 
very similar paragraphs, but in separate areas of the report, demonstrate the way this focus 
was almost exclusively maintained on the legal and regulatory powers and responsibilities 
that exist, but were not effectively used within Rotherham. These paragraphs also help to 
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portray the role of the government as one of gifting powers and responsibilities to local 
authorities:  
Tackling CSE effectively requires a council and its partners to mobilise their services 
and powers together. The Council has a duty to safeguard the victims. It also governs 
the landscape in which CSE is played out including many schools, care homes, parks, 
taxis and take away food shops. Councils have powers of licensing and regulation 
which can be used to disrupt illegal activity in these places and keep the community 
safe. This is in addition to the duties and powers of the police (Casey, 2015: 16).  
Tackling CSE is a community safety issue. Street grooming was happening in the 
community of which RMBC is the custodian including parks, takeaways, taxis, at the 
Interchange, in hotels, in houses, in alleyways and in the town centre. These are all 
areas where the local authority has a presence and has powers and responsibilities 
which could have contributed towards disrupting perpetrators and protecting victims, 
such as injunctions and powers to tackle nuisance behaviour (Casey, 2015: 53) 
 
The second core argument related to a number of ‘facts’ which Casey often presented as 
‘uncontested’, ‘undeniable’ or ‘cohesive’ (p.5, 26).  These were presented as ‘truths’ and 
were labelled as ‘uncomfortable’ and, on one occasion, ‘awkward’ (p.34). The language of 
‘facts’ and ‘truths’ is synonymous with an ethic of justice approach (Gilligan, 1982). Casey 
even stated that ‘what we ended up doing was sort of an investigation, an inquiry rather 
than an inspection’ that tried to ‘get under the skin of what was happening’ in Rotherham 
(Aston, 2015). However, in contrast to an ethic of care approach, which emphasizes 
empathy and compassion over right or wrong, an ethic of justice approach emerges from 
situations where formal rules can be applied and where concrete decisions about right and 
wrong are made. In this context it was evident that Casey’s approach attempted to 
apportion blame and deliver justice where it was felt to be needed.   
4. The presentation of a credible report 
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Framing strategies were used to explore how certain perspectives and arguments were 
presented (see Reisigl & Wodak, 2001). The report is presented, or framed, as an 
independent, and therefore objective, well-resourced inspection/investigation into what 
happened in Rotherham. The ‘Background and Methodology’ section of the report sets out 
the scale of the work. Readers are informed that 200 interviews were conducted and the 
written literature surveyed by the Inspection Team comprised of 7000 documents; 68 past 
and current cases in Children’s Services; 19 staff case files; and 22 taxi licensing cases. 
The report unfortunately does not clarify how all of this data was systematically collected, 
recorded, analysed or stored, or what previous experience members of the Inspection 
Team, many of whom worked for Casey on the Troubled Families programme, had in 
undertaking similar pieces of work. It is also difficult to conceive how Casey and her team 
analysed so much information given that they were only initially given eight weeks to carry 
out the inspection and leave ‘no stone unturned’ (DCLG, 2014b). It is evident that the team 
did struggle with this timescale as they requested, and were granted, an extension of six 
weeks. However what is of concern is that this is still much shorter that the timeframe 
provided for the Jay Report (2014) which was compiled over 8 months. 
5. The emotive production of uncontested facts   
The fifth and final strategy in the DHA explored the extent to which issues were articulated 
overtly and whether they were intensified or mitigated (see Reisigl & Wodak, 2001). The 
very first sentence of the Casey Report states ‘Terrible things happened in Rotherham and 
on a significant scale’ (p.5). As we stated at the beginning of this paper, we do not disagree 
with this statement. However, the report goes on to create the impression that things were 
much worse than even Casey and her team had expected and these are the comments 
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which further intensify the emotive production of what Casey refers to as ‘the uncontested 
facts’:  
However, this was not the situation I encountered when I reached Rotherham. Instead, I 
found a Council in denial. They denied that there had been a problem, or if there had 
been, that it was not as big as was said. If there was a problem, they certainly were not 
told – it was someone else’s job. (p5) 
 
To further strengthen this argument, the report comments on how the Inspection Team 
found that ‘the position had worsened’ (p87) following an OfSTED inspection which had 
rated the Children’s Service as ‘inadequate’. The introduction concludes with:   
The commissioning of the [Jay] report and later, the resignation of the Leader, are 
actions suggestive of a council that: 
• accepts the need to examine its past 
• accepts that it may have got things wrong 
• has an intention to put right those wrongs 
• wants to challenge its shortcomings 
• and wants to ensure that nothing like this would happen again 
Except that’s not the Rotherham we found upon arrival for this inspection or have seen since. 
(p14) 
 
As mentioned previously, affective terms have the power to persuade readers that they 
should be suspicious of what they read. Indeed, Casey utilises emotionally charged language 
similar to the quote above throughout the whole report. Such affective documents reflect 
and generate feeling rules that incorporate profound regret at ‘past actions or inactions’ 
with which the child’s suffering could have been prevented (Warner, 2015:113). Through 
texts such as political statements and official documents, discourse is therefore provided 
with the power to travel and affect its readers (Altheide, 1996).   
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This is evident in some of the section headings in the report which include for example, 
‘Children’s Services Failure’, and questions such as ‘Where were the police?’, ‘Where were 
the rest of the council?’ and ‘Cover up?’ Far from being the product of a ‘robust and 
thorough’ (DCLG, 2014b) inspection, the Casey Report is instead laced with loaded, emotive 
and subjective rhetoric which firmly places blame and suspicion on local services. Yet 
rhetorical questions about wider social, political and economic contexts in which these 
services operate such as: ‘Why did central government withdraw their resources?’ and 
‘Where was the political support for social work?’ were absent from the report. In essence, 
there was no critical reflection regarding the consequences of wide-ranging neoliberal 
reforms on social work policy and practice (Garrett, 2009; Rogowski, 2013). 
Part 2: Some ‘other’ uncomfortable truths 
The first part of our analysis examined what was written in the Casey Report. In this second 
part we explore that which was not discussed. Drawing on Lukes’ Three Dimensional Power 
framework, we wanted to consider the following questions:  What had been kept off the 
agenda surrounding Rotherham? What had not been done or examined? What kind of 
decisions had been avoided?  
Lukes’ framework complements the DHA analysis, as it provides a lens through which the 
absence of the central state in anything that happened in Rotherham can be revealed. It 
should be noted that early examples of ‘non-decision making’ included the sole focus on 
RMBC and the narrow ‘Terms of Reference’ for the inspection (DCLG, 2014b). These political 
and territorial boundaries that were imposed upon the purportedly independent inspection 
team prevented the possibility occurring that central government did play a role in the 
events that unfolded. 
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The three areas we will concentrate on in particular are ones that we believe should have 
been central to discussions of child protection practice: resources, media narratives, and 
child protection procedures.  
Lack of available resources  
Although the report does briefly highlight that in interviews community and social workers 
felt that ‘resources were an issue’ (p. 39), there is no in-depth examination of how a 
reduction in resources may have actually impacted on the services provided. Yet as 
mentioned previously, a recommendation made by the HASC (2013) stated that if there was 
going to be any degree of success in tackling the issue of CSE then financial support for 
agencies was needed.  
In addition, Jay (2014) highlighted in her report that Risky Business, the agency originally 
created by Rotherham Council to address the issue of sexual exploitation, closed in 2011 
because of funding cuts. However, this information was not included in the Casey Report. 
Instead, a counter-argument was advanced, one which presented the uniqueness of RMBC 
and argued that the decision ‘to close the service down’ was made because of the issue of 
CSE:  
Rotherham is different in that it was repeatedly told by its own youth service what was 
happening and it chose, not only to not act, but to close that service down. This is important 
because it points to how it has dealt with uncomfortable truths put before it (Casey, 2015: 
5). 
Jordan (2011) has contended that the sudden reduction in council resources occurred when 
the Coalition Government was elected in 2010 and a raft of cuts and reforms were 
introduced yet the consequences of such actions were not discussed explicitly in the report. 
Rather than acknowledge the role that central government may have played in contributing 
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to Rotherham’s overspent budget, this point appears to have been overlooked. Instead, 
Casey rebukes Rotherham further:  
Financial pressures should always be considered but the issue for us is whether there 
was evidence that decisions about children’s safety were unduly affected by financial 
decisions (2015: 43).  
 
This may be Casey’s view but it does not account for the significant costs that are incurred if 
the provision of secure accommodation is required by the agency to help keep children safe 
from sexual exploitation. Residential placements are expensive and charge anywhere in the 
region from £3000- £5000 per week (McNicoll, 2014). In 2012, the Directors of twelve 
Children’s Services in the North East of England wrote a joint letter to the Department for 
Education (DfE) warning that extra funding was needed if any serious or unintended 
consequences were to be avoided (Pearson, 2012). At a time when all local authorities were 
expected to make millions of pounds worth of cuts (see Jordan, 2011), it would have been 
unreasonable to expect Rotherham to fund placements for so many children without 
financial support from the government.  
Media narratives and public perception 
Both Casey (2015), and the HASC (2013), criticised RMBC for focusing on children not 
teenagers but neither explored why this may have happened. Yet given that they had 
witnessed a child abuse tragedy grip the media’s attention, it was only natural for 
Rotherham, and other councils, to focus their attention and resources on children under the 
age of five. Peter Connelly, also known as Baby P, died in 2007 and in 2008 social workers 
and councils across England watched Sharon Smith, and her team from Haringey, get vilified 
and condemned for their perceived failures (Warner, 2015). The story of Peter’s death 
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became ‘a full-blown national outbreak of public hysteria’ with ‘a tabloid narrative’ which 
was driven by official panic, fear and blame avoidance (Jones, 2014: ix). To omit this 
narrative from the report suggests that the government had an ‘uncomfortable truth’ of its 
own to conceal. It was, after all, David Cameron, with the support of Rebekah Brooks and a 
petition of 1.6 million signatures from The Sun, who contributed to one of the most 
significant moral panics ever known in social work (Jones, 2014). Similarly, whilst the Casey 
report made reference to the ‘race issue’, this was only considered in the context of local 
services and ‘RMBC’s inability to talk about race’ (p.34). No meaningful discussion of wider 
racial inequalities and injustice, the racialization of CSE in the UK, the ‘contaminated 
whiteness’ (Tyler, 2008: 26) of young white working-class women who associate with 
working-class minority ethnic and immigrant populations, or media moral panics 
surrounding the putative deviance of Muslim communities more generally can be found in 
the report. 
Procedures in child protection practice 
The final point that was not considered by Casey relates to a criticism she made within the 
report under the heading ‘Children’s Social Care Failure’ (2015: 42). In trying to explain why 
social workers failed children, Casey contended that this was because ‘children’s social care 
operated in a straitjacket of assessments which failed to acknowledge CSE’ (p.42).  
However what is not appropriately considered is that unfortunately, this is the context in 
which social work is practised today. Indeed, many argue against these rigid, bureaucratic 
systems which refuse to bend to enable creative and innovative practice (Featherstone et al. 
2014; White et al. 2010). As a result, practitioners focus on completing bureaucracy speedily 
so as to meet targets, ration resources and assess risk (see Garrett, 2009; Rogowski, 2013), 
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and are prevented from spending valuable time building relationships with teenagers 
vulnerable to sexual exploitation. It is important to note that these systems have not been 
designed by social workers, but by the Department of Education, those who are far removed 
from practice. The policy framework in social work therefore ‘hides great complexity’ and 
becomes a significant issue when there is frequent reorganisation, inconsistency and 
contradictions in policy making because it significantly affects social workers’ practice (Fox-
Harding, 2008:1). Rather than acknowledging the role that central government has in 
creating inconsistencies and contradictions in policy, social workers in Rotherham were 
instead depicted as ‘getting their practice wrong’ (Casey, 2015: 43).  
Discussion 
Although the Casey Report was presented as a well-resourced and credible independent 
inspection our findings suggest that it was far from robust and is, in effect, significantly 
flawed. Social researchers seek validity and rigour by exploring dominant themes that 
emerge in the data (Braun and Clarke, 2006). However, it is apparent from the beginning of 
the report that rather than carry out a thorough inspection, interview extracts were 
employed to develop and support the government’s own ‘moral agenda’ (Gillies, 2005:71) 
and concentrate on blaming those who ‘wilfully neglect’ vulnerable children (Holehouse, 
2015).  
Despite a number of participants challenging Jay’s findings, Casey and her team did not use 
the inspection as an opportunity to explore if their concerns held any merit. Instead, 
through the use of emotive and affective prose, Casey diverted the reader’s attention away 
from eliciting the accuracy of the proposed ‘facts’ by simply labelling participants inability to 
agree as a form of ‘denial’ (2015: 5). This distraction technique enabled Casey to 
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subsequently frame participants who were unwilling to accept her ‘truths’ as deviants and, 
in turn, persuade her audience that whatever people from RMBC said, they were not to be 
believed or trusted.  
By positioning RMBC as the agency that was 'incapable of tackling its weaknesses' Casey was 
furthermore able to attribute all of the troubles that emerged as being specific to its culture. 
This tactic deflected the focus away from central government who, despite playing an 
integral role in allocating resources (to families and authorities), establishing policy and 
legislative frameworks, and systems of practice which affect child welfare, were in this case 
exonerated from all responsibility. Austerity measures, cuts to local services and a wider 
programme of neoliberal reform were not discussed in the Casey report. Central 
government were instead positioned as largely benign as it was inferred that the only 
significant role they played in the events which led to Rotherham’s demise was when it was 
necessary for someone to ‘step in’ and make the council ‘squeaky clean’ (Casey, 2015: 77).  
It is also significant that despite being advised by the HASC (2013) that the problem of CSE 
was both systemic and cultural, the government commissioned and accepted the findings of 
a report that failed to acknowledge the wider context of contemporary child welfare issues. 
Rather than explore the impact that inadequate resources, media condemnation, policy and 
legislative frameworks have on social workers’ practice, the Casey Report (2015:5) instead 
overlooked these important contributing factors. Social workers were instead criticised for 
failing to break free from rigid, bureaucratic systems which promote the use of restrictive 
procedures and are designed to fit the ‘child rescue model’ which focuses inherently on a 
young child in a family abuse situation (Fox-Harding, 2008: 2).  
Conclusion 
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The report produced by Louise Casey did little to resolve the issues that social workers and 
local authorities nationally encountered during that time. Although Casey acknowledged 
that the existing child protection system was not designed for safeguarding children from 
CSE, the implications of what this actually meant were not properly explored. As a result, 
government have missed a significant opportunity to examine why the established model of 
doing child protection might be so problematic for parts of social work practice.  
Instead the focus remained firmly fixed on local (mal)practice and an argument was created 
which fostered the impression that many staff wilfully neglected children at risk of sexual 
exploitation. This main message conveyed in the report was that it was Rotherham’s 
attitude and approach to child protection that was uniquely problematic. Yet it has become 
increasingly clear that the problem of CSE and how it is handled is not unique to Rotherham, 
it has been an issue that many local authorities have faced across the country (HASC, 2013).  
Unfortunately, rather than considering how this nationwide problem could judiciously be 
resolved, David Cameron’s response to the Casey Report was to berate and punish those he 
felt were to blame so that he could ensure the ‘culture of denial’ was eradicated once and 
for all (Holehouse, 2015). This reaction will not however address the problem of CSE as it 
does not deliberate the impact austerity measures and neo-liberal forms of governance 
have on the provision of essential services. On the contrary, it successfully contributes to 
the current climate that social workers face in practice today, a climate which is deeply 
affected by fear, mistrust and blame.  
Acknowledgements 
We would like to thank Professor Brid Featherstone who introduced us and encouraged us 
to write this article. This article would not have been written without her support.  








Altheide, D.L. (1996) Qualitative media analysis. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Aston, S. (2015) Speaking truth to power: CSW interviews Troubled Families tsar Louise 
Casey, Civil Service World [Online] 24 March 2015, Available at 
http://www.civilserviceworld.com/articles/interview/speaking-truth-power-csw-interviews-
troubled-families-tsar-louise-casey  
Ayre, P. (2001) Child protection and the media: Lessons from the last three decades, British 
Journal of Social Work, 31, 887-901. 
Bennett R (2012) Local authority officials 'should scrub floors', The Times 27 Apr. 2012: 15 
BBC (2016) Rotherham abuse trial: Six guilty of sex offences 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-35651366 
Braun, V. Clarke, V. (2006) Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative Research in 
Psychology, 3 (2), 77-101.  
Casey, L. (2012) Listening to troubled families. Department for Communities and Local 
Government.  
Casey, L. (2013) Troubled Families Programme [Online] 16 July 2013 Available at  
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/troubled-families-programme  
Casey, L. (2015) Report of Inspection of Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council. House of 
Commons, February 2015.  
DCLG (2014a) Governance in local government [Online] 10 September 2014 Available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/governance-in-local-government  
DCLG (2014b) Inspection launched into serious governance failings of Rotherham council 
[Online] 28 November2014 Available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/independent-inspection-of-rotherham-
metropolitan-borough-council  
Fairclough, N. & Wodak, R. (1997) ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’, in T. A. van Dijk (ed.) 
Discourse as Social Interaction (Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction. Vol.2) 
London: Sage 
The ‘troubled’ case of Rotherham 
27 
 
Featherstone, B., White, S., Morris, K. (2014) Reimagining child protection. Bristol: Policy 
Press.  
Featherstone, B., Crossley, S., Gupta, A., Leigh, J., Warner, J. White, S. (2015) Louise Casey 
report into CSE represents a missed opportunity for children. Community Care [Online]  20th 
March 2015 Available at http://www.communitycare.co.uk/2015/03/20/louise-casey-
report-cse-represents-missed-opportunity-children/  
Ferguson, H. (2015) To prevent child sex abuse, victims must not be seen as morally inferior, 
The Guardian [Online] 10 March 2015 Available at  
http://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/mar/10/prevent-child-sex-abuse-victims-not-
morally-inferior-oxfordshire  
Fox-Harding, L. (2008) Child social work, state and family in Kirkton, D. (Ed) Child Social Work 
Policy and Practice, London: Sage.  
Garrett, P. M. (2009) 'Transforming' children's services? : social work, neoliberalism and the 
'modern' world, Maidenhead: Open University Press 
Gentleman, A (2013) Troubled families tsar: intervention will free up resources, The 
Guardian [Online] 7 April 2013 Available at  
http://www.theguardian.com/society/2013/apr/07/troubled-families-tsar-intervention-
resources  
Gillies, V. (2005) Meeting parents’ needs? Discourses of ‘support’ and ‘inclusion’ in family 
policy. Critical Social Policy, 25 (1), 70-90.  
Holehouse, M. (2015) Council chiefs who ignore child abuse will be jailed, The Telegraph 
[Online] 3 February 2015 Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-
order/11445791/Council-chiefs-who-ignore-child-abuse-will-be-jailed.html  
Home Affairs Select Committee (2013) Child Sexual Exploitation and the response to 
localised grooming. House of Commons, London: The Stationary Office Limited.  
Hughes, N. (2011) Young people ‘as risk’ or young people ‘at risk’: Comparing discourses of 
anti-social behaviour in England and Victoria, Critical Social Policy, 31 (3), 388-409 
Jay, A. (2014) Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Exploitation in Rotherham, 1997-2013 
[Online] Available at 
http://www.rotherham.gov.uk/downloads/file/1407/independent_inquiry_cse_in_rotherha
m  
Jones, R. (2014) The story of Baby P: Setting the Record Straight, Bristol: Policy Press.  
Jordan, B. (2011) Making sense of the ‘Big Society’: Social work and the moral order. Journal 
of Social Work, 12 (6), 630-646.  
Lukes, S. (2005) Power: A Radical View (2nd edition), Basingstoke: Palgrave 
The ‘troubled’ case of Rotherham 
28 
 
Maier, E. (2013) A culture of fear won’t deliver, Local Government Chronicle [Online] 5 
September 2013 Available at http://www.lgcplus.com/politics-and-policy/a-culture-of-fear-
wont-deliver/5062837.fullarticle  
McNicoll, A. (2014) Cuts to safeguarding teams and looked-after children services as council 
spending drops. Community Care [Online] 16 April 2014 Available at 
http://www.communitycare.co.uk/2014/04/16/cuts-safeguarding-teams-looked-children-
services-council-spending-drops/  
Norfolk, A. (2013) ‘MPs seek hidden files on Rotherham sex grooming’, The Times [Online] 9 
January 2013 Available at http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/uk/article3651718.ece  
Pearson, A. (2012) Warning of North East children’s services crisis, The Journal [Online] 21 
March 2012 Available at http://www.thejournal.co.uk/news/north-east-news/warning-
north-east-childrens-services-4414087  
Pidd, H. (2014) ‘Shaun Wright’s record in Rotherham comes under uncomfortable scrutiny’, 
The Guardian [Online] 27 August 2014 Available at  
http://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/aug/27/rotherham-abuse-stark-evidence-
ignored-by-police-and-council 
Reisigl M. & Wodak, R. (2001) Discourse and Discrimination: Rhetorics of racism and 
antisemitism, London: Routledge 
Reisigl M. & Wodak, R. (2009) ‘The Discourse-Historical Approach’ in R. Wodak & M. Meyer 
(eds.) Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis, London: Sage 
Rogowski, S. (2013) Critical Social Work with Children and Families, Bristol: Policy Press 
Skeggs, B. (2004) Class, self, culture, London: Routledge.  
Squires, P. (2006) New Labour and the politics of antisocial behaviour, Critical Social Policy, 
26 (1), 144-168 
Stevenson, L. (2015) Social workers to face five years in prison for failing to protect children 
from sexual abuse, warns Cameron, Community Care [Online] 3 March 2015 Available at  
http://www.communitycare.co.uk/2015/03/03/social-workers-face-five-years-prison-
failing-protect-children-sexual-abuse-warns-cameron/  
Tyler, I. (2008) '"Chav Mum, Chav Scum" : class disgust in contemporary Britain.' Feminist 
Media Studies, vol 8, no. 1, pp. 17-34.  
The Guardian (2005) An evening with Louise Casey, The Guardian [Online] 7 July 2005 
Available at http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/jul/07/ukcrime.whitehall  
Warner (2015) The emotional politics of social work and child protection, Bristol: Policy 
press.  
Williams, M. (2014) ‘Home office worker investigating child abuse had data stolen’ The 
Guardian [Online] 1 September 2014 Available at  





Winnett R and Kirkup J (2012) Problem families ‘have too many children’, The Telegraph 
[Online] 20 July 2012 Available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/9416535/Problem-families-have-too-many-
children.html  
Wodak, R. & Meyer, M. (2009) ‘Critical discourse analysis: history, agenda, theory and 
methodology’ in R. Wodak & M. Meyer (eds.) Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis, 
London: Sage 
 
 
 
